Th e Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has embarked on an ambitious multipart project, titled Base Erosion and Profi t Shifting (BEPS), with 15 "Actions" to prevent multinational corporations (MNCs) from escaping their "fair share" of the tax burden. Although the tax returns of these MNCs comply with the laws of every country where they do business, the proposition that MNCs need to pay more tax enjoys considerable political resonance as government budgets are strained, the world economy is struggling, income inequality is rising, and the news media have publicized instances of corporations legally lowering their global tax burdens by reporting income in low-tax jurisdictions and expenses in high-tax jurisdictions. To achieve the goal of increasing taxes on MNCs, the OECD-spurred by G-20 fi nance ministers-recommends changes in national legislation, revision of existing bilateral tax treaties, and a new multilateral agreement for participating countries.
At their St. Petersburg Summit in September 2013, G-20 leaders adopted the OECD terms of reference wholesale as the Tax Annex to the Summit Declaration. Th e OECD is circulating drafts for each Action topic, inviting comments, and then circulating revised drafts. Non-OECD G-20 membersArgentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa-and smaller OECD countries that are not members of the G-20 have been invited to participate on an equal footing in the OECD Committee on Fiscal Aff airs to review and revise the draft reports. Altogether the project has 44 participating countries.
Th e OECD was charged with completing its 15 reports, one for each action, by December 2015, but the completion date for Action 15 has been pushed back to the end of 2016. Action 15 will cap the project by proposing a "multilateral tax instrument" to curtail the "abusive" behavior of MNCs. Th is instrument will be a new version of the OECD's Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, last updated in 2014. It will refl ect the recommendations of the preceding 14 Action reports but will not have the force of a treaty or agreement between nations and so will not have the "hard law" character of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or other trade and investment agreements. However, given its genesis, it will exert a powerful "soft law" infl uence on bilateral tax treaties as they are negotiated and renegotiated. 3 Th ere is no agreed timeline for implementing individual BEPS Actions, but they have already infl uenced tax offi cials as they explore new ways to extract revenue from MNCs. More than 30 unilateral measures have been implemented in the wake of draft BEPS reports, mostly to the disadvantage of US MNCs with respect to their subsidiaries doing business in low-tax jurisdictions (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2014). Australia, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom have particularly targeted the subsidiaries of US MNCs. 4 Troublesome aspects of the BEPS project cannot be ignored simply because the new OECD Model Convention may never ripen into a multilateral tax treaty.
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S ROLE AND CONGRESSIONAL REACTION
At the St. Petersburg G-20 Summit in 2013, the Obama administration supported the BEPS project, thinking that the OECD initiative would reinforce its own eff orts to tax the foreign income of US MNCs. As the project grew legs, US Treasury offi cials gradually became aware that several BEPS Actions would have a greater impact on US MNCs than on European MNCs, but by then the train had left the 3. Given its infl uence, the Model Convention is akin to "customary international law" in the international tax arena.
4. For example, France, which has a relatively high corporate tax rate (36 percent, as shown in table 1a below), can target a US MNC by compelling its French subsidiary to report copyright or patent income in France rather than in a third-tier subsidiary based in Switzerland (which has an average 21 percent corporate tax rate). Th e United Kingdom has just implemented a "diverted profi ts" tax principally aimed at digital companies and thus labeled the "Google tax." See the discussion under BEPS Action 1 and see "Global Revenue Grab", Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2015. OECD station. Th e Obama administration was unwilling to stop a project it had a hand in launching and for which it felt mixed aff ection.
Hence the US Congress stepped in. Early in 2015, after a round of hearings, the US Senate Finance
Committee awakened to the negative implications of the BEPS project. It is worth quoting from the recent bipartisan report (United States Senate Committee on Finance 2015d) 5 :
Even if the United States does not accede to the BEPS recommendations, US multinational companies will still be impacted. US companies will be subject to base erosion rules in eff ect in other countries; and, in fact, are the intended targets of many of the new rules going into eff ect. Th e UK diverted profi ts tax is often referred to as the "Google Tax" and the Australian proposal as the "Netfl ix Tax."
As former Chairman Camp recently stated, "the bottom line is that change is coming-if not here at home, then it is certainly coming from overseas." If policymakers fail to implement new rules in a timely fashion to combat overseas action, BEPS-related and unilateral actions around the globe will undoubtedly result in far more taxes paid into foreign coff ers by US multinational companies, with a corresponding revenue and job loss here in the United States.
PERSPECTIVES AND PRIORS OF THIS EVALUATION
To be clear and upfront, this evaluation of the BEPS project is written from a US perspective. Th e United States is the dominant source of outward foreign direct investment (FDI), the home of leading high-technology MNCs, and the country that maintains the highest corporate tax rate among advanced nations and off ers the weakest incentives for research and development (R&D) activity. Its interests therefore diff er considerably from those of European, Asian, or Latin American countries. Moreover, US concerns about international tax rules transcend the focus of US Treasury offi cials on tax revenue. Th e prosperity of US fi rms and the growth of US investment, R&D, and jobs are far more important goals.
Critics of US MNC tax strategies cite well-known examples of companies locating the source of their income in low-tax jurisdictions to charge that these companies merely shuffl e paper to take advantage of favorable tax systems abroad. Th ey mistakenly believe that the system can be corrected to curb such "abuses" and that more tax revenue can be extracted from MNCs with little or no eff ect on real economic activity. Defi nitive studies remain to be written, but the evidence so far indicates that taxes on MNCs matter a great deal.
In an overview of then-current literature, de Mooij and Ederveen (2008) associated a 1 percentage point increase in the corporate income tax with a 1.05 percent decline in the corporate tax base as fewer MNCs opt to establish domestic subsidiaries and as existing enterprises respond to an increased cost of capital by cutting real investment. Consequently, over a period of years, a country with relatively high corporate income taxes sees stunted growth of its capital stock.
Recent studies have quantifi ed the consequences of this reduction. John Diamond, George Zodrow, and Robert Carroll (2013) found that declining foreign corporate tax rates have already injured US economic performance, and that the adverse eff ect will get worse over time in the absence of US tax reform. Th ey calculate that the fall in foreign tax rates (making foreign countries more competitive)
reduced US GDP by at least 1.2 percent in 2013, and that the adverse eff ect will expand to at least 1.5 percent in the long run. A diminished US capital stock has consequences for US workers as well, eventually reducing real wages by 1 percent. In a similar vein, Anaraki (2013) calculated that a 10 percent increase in the US corporate rate was associated with a 1.5 percent decline in real GDP and a 4 percent decline in hourly wages.
In a study commissioned by the Business Roundtable, Ernst & Young (2015) concluded that over the past decade, if the US corporate tax rate had been lowered to the OECD average of 25 percent, US fi rms would have acquired $590 billion of assets in cross-border mergers instead of shedding $179 billion.
Some 1,300 companies would have remained as US fi rms rather than being acquired by foreign fi rms.
Similarly, a technical study by a group of European authors, using logit analysis, found that US crossborder acquisitions would have increased by 17 percent between 2004 and 2010 if the United States had adopted a territorial system of taxing the foreign income of US MNCs (Feld et al. 2013) .
US fi rms have been able to soften the impact of high US taxes by shifting some of their income to low-tax jurisdictions. But Diamond, Zodrow, and Carroll (2013) observed that these activities actually did more to erode the corporate tax base than changes in the location of real investment. As noted by Michael Mandel (2015) , eff orts to curb profi t shifting can have adverse eff ects. If profi t shifting becomes more diffi cult, operations in high-tax jurisdictions (notably the United States) will become more costly, prompting more corporations to invest in friendly countries and some to "invert," or shift their headquarters to a foreign location.
In light of these adverse consequences, "fi xes" that serve to bolster the corporate income tax are not helpful. Instead, international tax competition that undermines high corporate tax rates (such as those imposed by the United States and Japan) represents a constructive force in the world economy.
As the OECD (2008) has recognized in other studies, the corporate income tax distorts investment decisions and curtails economic growth. Income inequality now ranks high among political issues, but 7 taxing corporations is not the solution. Th e right way is through progressive personal taxation, including measures that attack international tax evasion schemes by wealthy individuals.
6 Th e US corporate income tax could in fact be replaced-with no loss of tax revenue or progressivity-by attributing undistributed corporate income to the benefi cial individual owners and taxing that income at the personal level (see Hufbauer and Vieiro 2012) . While a grand transformation along these lines cannot be found on the political horizon, signs exist of incremental movement away from the corporate income tax (especially through lower rates) and toward more progressive personal taxes (via fewer deductions and better enforcement). Th e OECD and national policymakers should place far greater eff ort on taxing wealthy individuals and rather less on chasing MNCs. 7 Th riving MNCs create jobs and foster economic growth; it's hard to say the same of the superrich in their personal capacity.
Finally, taking a global perspective, in the 70 years following the Second World War the reduction of trade and investment barriers made a huge contribution to world prosperity (Maddison 2001, Hufbauer and Schott 2013) . Fostered by MNCs, both trade and investment-the two sides of economic integration-fl ourished. It makes no sense to interrupt the process of integration by erecting barriers to the expansion of MNCs in the form of higher taxes and overlapping national tax claims. To be sure, the BEPS project does not say anything about tax rates, but its central goal is to increase the corporate tax base. And while the OECD has long attempted to avoid double taxation, some of the BEPS Actions could inspire a tax tug of war between home and host countries on income generated by global value chains that is claimed by tax authorities in both countries.
BEFORE IMPLEMENTING BEPS RECOMMENDATIONS
Before the Obama administration or its successor seriously considers implementing the BEPS recom- lower (the OECD average is about 25 percent), 9 it should align its business tax regime to the global norm of territorial taxation, and like other R&D leaders it should adopt a "patent box" system for taxing intellectual property income.
10
Th e patent box system, widely adopted in Europe, creates a paper box for reporting and taxing intellectual property income at low rates, clustered around 5 percent but ranging from zero percent to 15 percent, often with the proviso that the underlying R&D be done in the patent box country (United States Senate Committee on Finance 2015a Committee on Finance 2015c). Th e objectives are to boost corporate investment in the United States, stimulate the creation of intellectual property, and diminish tax incentives for US MNCs to locate managerial, R&D, or production activities abroad or to invert the entire corporate structure and give it a foreign parent fi rm.
Once the United States has reformed its own corporate tax system, it will be better positioned to evaluate the BEPS recommendations and determine which of them are compatible with US interests.
To aid its analysis, the Senate Finance Committee has already commissioned an evaluation of BEPS by 9. State corporate income taxes bring the total (federal plus state) burden to about 39 percent as shown in table 1a; however we make no recommendation as to state taxes.
10. Information about the patent box is available at www.gov.uk/corporation-tax-the-patent-box (accessed on September 6, 2015).
11. Congressman Paul Ryan, chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, has fl oated legislation that would create a US patent box with a 10 percent rate. See Wall Street Journal, "House GOP Seeks Tax Break for Innovation, " July 30, 2015, A3. 12. According to the IRET model, a 10 percentage point cut in the corporate tax rate would increase equilibrium GDP by 2.3 percent. See Hufbauer and Wong (2011 
CORE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE BEPS PROJECT
Box 1 summarizes the 15 BEPS Actions in the favorable language used by the OECD. As a prelude to the critique of the individual Action reports, three core assumptions underlying the BEPS project deserve attention.
Defending the Corporate Income Tax
Foremost, the project assumes that the corporate income tax should be defended and even increased. Th is is far from certain. Many people have an oversimplifi ed view of who really "pays" the corporate income tax. Workers, capitalists, or consumers? Voters seem confi dent that the tax is not paid by them, but they do not have a clear understanding of the indirect consequences.
By design, corporate taxation places the heaviest burden on the most successful corporations, which are generally the most innovative fi rms and the biggest R&D spenders. But rising international mobility of capital means that taxes, and in particular the corporate income tax, nominally borne by capital are to a large degree actually borne by labor. Because the corporate income tax reduces both physical investment and R&D outlays, each worker is complemented by a smaller stock of physical and intellectual capital, and therefore produces less and receives lower pay. One CBO estimate suggests that as much as 70 percent of corporate income taxes might ultimately be paid by workers (Randolph 2006 income retained in the corporation. Th is argument loses force to the extent that undistributed corporate income is attributed to shareholders and taxed as personal income. Tax systems are slowly moving in that direction, but they still have a good distance to go. 14 14. In the United States, the growing role of "pass-through" entities as vehicles for conducting business activity has been the main means of taxing undistributed business income in the hands of benefi cial owners. In addition, the Internal Revenue Service can
Box 1 The 15 actions to address BEPS
Action 1 identifies the main difficulties that the digital economy poses for the application of existing international tax rules and examines issues such as the liability of IT companies for corporate taxation, and the collection of value-added tax (VAT)/general sales tax (GST) on digital goods and services.
Action 2 examines means to neutralize the effects of double nontaxation, double deduction, and long-term deferral created by hybrid instruments and entities.
Action 3 develops recommendations for revising controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules so as to increase tax on "mobile income" (patents, copyrights, trademarks, interest).
Action 4 seeks to prevent base erosion via the booking of interest expense and other financial payments in a manner that achieves excessive interest deductions.
Action 5 puts a priority on improving transparency, including the compulsory and spontaneous exchange of rulings that create preferential tax regimes.
Action 6 seeks to prevent the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances and to clarify that tax treaties are not intended to generate double nontaxation.
For the present, these familiar defenses suffi ce to prop up the corporate income tax structure attack "incorporated pocketbooks" by invoking "personal holding company" legislation and by deeming the distribution of excess retained earnings.
15. "Pass-through entities" are particularly popular in the United States and collectively account for almost half of business activity. Th e Internal Revenue Code identifi es no fewer than six types of pass-through entities. Th e growth of these entities, combined with burdens placed on public corporations by the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank laws, serves to wall off a substantial share of business activity from individual investors.
16. See OECD panel data on the nonexistent relationship between corporate tax revenue as a percent of GDP and the statutory tax rates, presented in table 7 of Hufbauer and Vieiro (2012) . Also see Mertens and Ravn (2011, p.17) , who examined US data from 1950 to 2006 and found that a "corporate income tax cut leads to a small decline in corporate tax revenues only after the fi rst quarter and a surplus thereafter." Th ey conclude that "a one percentage point cut in the [average eff ective corporate tax rate] leads to a rise in aggregate activity of around 0.5% which increases slightly to a maximum of 0.7% in the 5th quarter."
17. See the chart in Olson's testimony, summarizing US and peer group eff ective tax rates reported by 11 separate studies: US tax rates are uniformly higher, by 5 percent to 15 percent, depending on the study (United States Senate Finance Committee 2015a). F r a n c e 1 2 1 1 1 6 1 4 1 4 1 7 G e r m a n y 6 3 6 5 3 4 
Defi ning Tax Abuse
In 1964, US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart famously wrote of pornography, "I know it when I see it." Tax offi cials feel the same about "tax abuse." Th us the BEPS project assumes at the outset that its perceptions of tax abuse are widely shared. But what is tax avoidance and tax abuse to one group of observers might look more like a sensible business strategy to another group presented with the same alternatives.
Deliberate violations of national tax laws constitute tax evasion, countenanced by no one. As to evasion, the lines are usually bright and clear, even if not always enforced. But when do legitimate tactics to avoid high taxes wander into the murky land of tax abuse? Th e pejorative labels embraced by the BEPS project, "base erosion" and "profi t shifting," are loaded terms that allow OECD experts to condemn as illegitimate practices that they dislike. 19. Ignoring any impact on investment and activity levels, these payments can be regarded as a benefi cial redistribution of income from shareholders in rich countries to citizens in poor countries.
20. For detailed expositions of alternatives, see Hufbauer and Wong (2011) and Hufbauer and Vieiro (2012) .
harmonize, to some extent, the transfer pricing rules that partly determine each country's corporate tax base. Even harmonization of transfer pricing rules is diffi cult, and countries that stand to lose a substantial chunk of their tax base will surely protest.
An example will illustrate the problem. By defi nition, copyrights, trademarks, and patents are unique assets. Correspondingly, tax offi cials can justifi ably diff er as to the appropriate capital value of these assets when sold to an affi liate or the appropriate annual royalty rate for their use. If a host country with a substantial corporate tax rate (e.g., 25 percent) has entered into a tax treaty with an MNC home country that stipulates a low royalty withholding tax rate (e.g., 5 percent), host country tax offi cials may be tempted to disallow "excessive" royalty payments as a corporate deduction and thereby assess the higher corporate tax rate on the disallowed payment.
OVERVIEW OF BEPS ACTIONS: TROUBLESOME, HARMLESS, AND USEFUL
Based on a review of published Action drafts, a number of the core suggestions are highly troublesome from a US perspective. Some suggestions are harmless, and a few are actually useful. In the evaluation that follows, hyperlinks are provided to the latest draft of each Action. Rather than discuss the Actions in numerical order, the analysis proceeds according to the following fi ve categories:
 Quantitative evaluation of BEPS. Th is heading concerns Action 11, arguably the centerpiece of the BEPS project in terms of identifying the prospective tax revenue gains from changing laws and treaties.
 Troublesome suggestions. 21 Part of Action 1, extending the "permanent establishment" concept to reach digital commerce, is certainly troublesome (another part of Action 1, dealing with valueadded [VAT] and retail sales tax, is actually useful), and Action 3, which would enlarge US taxation of income earned abroad by US MNCs, ranks among the most troublesome. Action 4, which would limit US interest deductions, is moderately troublesome. Action 6, designed to thwart "treaty abuse,"
and Action 7, designed to enlarge the "permanent establishment" concept, are pernicious to US interests. Actions 8, 9, and 10-discussed in a single Action paper-would potentially give the IRS a powerful lever to raise taxes on the US parents of MNC groups, putting them at a competitive disadvantage to their foreign counterparts.
 Harmless suggestions. Two Action items off er harmless suggestions, designed to tidy up the complex domain of international taxation. Giving Action 2 the benefi t of the doubt, its analysis of hybrid arrangements fi ts in the harmless category. Action 12 seems principally aimed at foreign tax administrators and might make little diff erence to the United States.
21. Th ose who regard practically any increase in MNC tax payments as a "good thing" will not, of course, agree with this characterization that these are "troublesome suggestions." However, from a US perspective, it's not clear that the proposed Actions would bring much additional revenue to the US Treasury, and from a world perspective they risk throwing sand in the wheels of globalization.
 Useful suggestions. Th e part of Action 1 dealing with VAT and retail sales tax on digital trade belongs in this category. So does Action 5, which might enable Treasury analysts to compare the global tax burden on US and foreign MNCs. Action 13 calls for country-by-country information sharing, as between tax authorities, and this could also improve US analysis of the competitive landscape. Action 14 is the best suggestion in the whole BEPS project, as it points the way to faster dispute settlement between two or more tax authorities squeezing the same MNC.
 Work in progress. Action 15 is intended to pull the suggestions of the previous Actions into a single multilateral tax treaty that would presumably be opened for signature by participating countries and might also serve as a model for the revision of bilateral tax treaties.
Quantitative Evaluation of BEPS

Action 11. Improving the Analysis of BEPS
In the Democratic primary debate of 1984, candidate Walter Mondale famously asked his opponent Gary
Hart, "Where's the beef?" Action 11 provides the economic beef for the BEPS project. In fact, the other Action reports are almost devoid of useful economic information.
Action 11 essentially equates tax abuse with the concentration of MNC mobile income-particularly interest, royalties, and sales commissions-in low-tax jurisdictions ("tax havens"). Like previous scholars (e.g., Hines and Rice 1994 , Clausing 2009 , and Grubert 2012 , the OECD authors of Action 11 report that MNC interest income and royalties from intangible assets are highly concentrated in countries with low eff ective tax rates. Since these low-tax countries are usually small, lacking in scientifi c and engineering talent, and without large domestic capital markets, the Action 11 report, like its academic predecessors, trumpets a mismatch between the locale of "value creation" and the locale of reported income. Th is mismatch is held up as exhibit A for the quantitative importance of BEPS.
Action 11 cites a few of the large number of academic articles (more than 100) that show three things: fi rst, a concentration of MNC profi ts in low-tax jurisdictions; second, a strong connection between low eff ective tax rates and reported profi ts; and third, a central role of interest and royalty payments in these relationships.
It is worth paraphrasing part of Action 11's review of the literature. Th e summary authored by Dhammika Dharmapala (2014) reported that recent empirical studies estimate a smaller magnitude of profi t shifting than earlier studies, apparently owing to the use of microfi rm-level data, thereby holding more nontax factors constant. A few recent studies estimated that as little as 2 to 4 percent of parent MNC income was shifted to low-tax jurisdictions. Another summary, authored by Nadine Riedel (2014) ,
reported that prior studies unanimously fi nd evidence of tax-motivated profi t shifting, but with estimates ranging between 5 percent and 30 percent of MNC profi ts shifted to low-tax jurisdictions. Interestingly, Harry Grubert (2012) , who used a sample of US corporate tax returns to investigate the rising foreign share in total income of US MNCs between 1996 and 2002, showed that greater R&D intensity at the fi rm level reduced foreign eff ective tax rates. Th is fi nding indirectly indicates that the strategic location of intangible assets facilitated profi t shifting.
Adding to the literature just sketched, Action 11 presents seven indicators that suggest a combination of base erosion and profi t shifting:
 Indicator 1: Concentration of net foreign direct investment to GDP in low-tax jurisdictions What the BEPS project seeks to do is to move the legal goal posts, so that actions that are perfectly legal today will be illegal tomorrow. But it's far from certain that measures recommended in the other Action reports would better align profi ts with the econometrics reported in Action 11. And if such measures did achieve a closer alignment, it's almost certain they would infl ict signifi cant damage on US economic interests, which go well beyond tax revenue. Until these and similar questions are answered, fi nance ministers everywhere, and particularly the US Treasury secretary, should reject the BEPS-inspired campaign to raise taxes on MNCs under the banner of "stopping abuse." In the midst of a lethargic US and world economy, with low growth projected for a decade to come, economic expansion, not revenue collection, should be the central objective.
Troublesome Suggestions
Action 1. Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy: Business Profi ts Tax
Th e part of Action 1 that deals with the taxation of business profi ts is troublesome.
Historically, the existence of a "permanent establishment" has served as the threshold for a host country to tax the business profi ts of a foreign fi rm. A permanent establishment (PE) required some physical presence by the foreign fi rm, beyond a mere warehouse. An international tax rule that was agreed long ago holds that the place where goods or services are sold does not, by itself, establish a right to tax business profi ts. Th e fi rm has to have some productive capacity-an offi ce, employees, or a plant-in the host country to create the appropriate "nexus" for taxing business profi ts.
With the advent of digital commerce, the old rule is now under attack. Th rough digital transactions fi rms can service customers abroad with no physical presence. Th is fact inspired the Action 1 Task Force to suggest new thresholds for taxing business profi ts. Th ese thresholds are built around the concept of "signifi cant presence" in the host country, somehow defi ned by volume of sales or number of bytes.
In eff ect, these lower thresholds would foster something like a tariff on imports of digital services, but characterized as a tax on business profi ts.
Th e United States should take a wary attitude toward this suggestion. US fi rms such as Microsoft, Hewlett Packard, and Amazon conduct an enormous and growing volume of online sales both domestically and internationally. Nearly all the intellectual capital behind the delivery of these digital products is created at the US headquarters, not the point of sale. In terms of "value creation," the jurisdiction where the ultimate consumer resides makes little or no contribution to business profi ts. , OECD 2015 , and USITC 2014 . Th e internet is a powerful tool not only for broad economic growth but also for social inclusion. It allows even small fi rms in developing countries to expand their customer base and benefi t from global growth. Moreover, it encourages specialization and trade even in the absence of progress on broader policy liberalization. To the extent that the BEPS process creates uncertainty by taxing bits and bytes, it will slow global growth and profoundly damage the prospects of fi rms on the bottom rung of the economic ladder.
Action 3. Strengthen CFC Rules
Controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) are subsidiary fi rms based outside an MNC's home country. By and large, CFCs are wholly owned by the parent MNC, but parent control, through direct and indirect ownership of more than 50 percent of voting rights, suffi ces to create a CFC. Second-and third-tier CFCs are common.
Th e Action 3 Task Force addressed several threshold issues (e.g., the defi nition of control), but its main concern was taxation by MNC parent countries of "mobile income" earned by CFCs. Under territorial systems, "passive income" earned by CFCs, which roughly equates to mobile income, may be taxed to some degree, often at a preferential rate. Th e BEPS project encourages participating countries to tax mobile income to a greater degree, by defi ning passive income to include more forms of mobile income, by requiring closer scrutiny of transactions that could entail profi t shifting,
and by taxing such income in the year earned by the CFC, preferably at the parent country's tax rate.
But recent decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) thwart the ambitious goal (perhaps secretly entertained by the BEPS project) of comprehensively taxing CFC mobile income. In Cadbury Schweppes and subsequent cases, the ECJ held that CFC rules that are justifi ed for the prevention of tax avoidance must "specifi cally target wholly artifi cial arrangements which do not refl ect economic reality and whose only purpose would be to obtain a tax advantage"
22
Although the ECJ's jurisprudence applies only when the parent MNC and the CFC are both situated in the European Economic Area, the BEPS project seeks to apply uniform recommendations on a worldwide basis. In other words, the recommendations seek to conform to ECJ jurisprudence as if it applied on a worldwide basis. Accordingly, the Action 3 Task Force off ers various tests to determine whether mobile income really has been the object of profi t shifting in a manner that would satisfy the ECJ. It remains to be seen whether countries with territorial tax systems will follow the BEPS lead and adopt more aggressive approaches.
In any event, unlike many countries, the United States has aggressively taxed certain forms of passive income earned by CFCs since 1962, when Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted at the behest of the Kennedy administration. Under complex but essentially mechanical rules, whose scope has been progressively enlarged over the past 50 years, the United States taxes CFC income derived from dividends, interest, royalties, and "base company" sales 23 -if those income streams constitute a dominant part of CFC earnings and the host country exhibits the character of a "tax haven."
Under the Obama administration, US Treasury offi cials would like to call on Action 3
recommendations to further expand the scope of Subpart F, whether or not other countries tax mobile 22. For legal case references and more detail, see paragraph 12 of the Action 3 report.
23
. A "base company" is a foreign subsidiary that takes title to US merchandise and resells that merchandise to buyers in third countries.
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CFC income to a greater extent. If Congress goes along with Treasury proposals, the eff ective tax rate on the worldwide operations of US MNCs will rise, rendering them less competitive with foreign MNCs.
In fact, the Obama Treasury has proposed that all CFC income, whether active or passive, be deemed distributed currently as a dividend to the parent MNC and taxed at a rate of 14 percent (allowing an off set for the foreign tax credit) (US Department of the Treasure 2015). While 14 percent is much lower than the normal federal statutory rate of 35 percent, if enacted this proposal would put US MNCs at a tax disadvantage relative to foreign MNCs.
Action 4. Limit Base Erosion via Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments
Th e recommendations in Action 4 serve as a counterpart to the hybrid mismatch suggestions in Action 2 (discussed below) and the CFC rules recommended in Action 3. Th e goal of Action 4 is to prevent interest and kindred payments from being deducted, to an excessive extent, from corporate income earned in high-tax jurisdictions.
Toward this goal, Action 4 starts by summarizing interest allocation rules currently used in several countries. Some of these rules cap deductions for interest expense by a fi xed ratio of the assets or earnings of individual members of the MNC group, in an eff ort to ensure that deductions are not out of line with underlying economic magnitudes. For example, deductible interest might be limited to 30 percent of earnings. More complex rules that take into account the particular circumstances of diff erent corporate groups, with respect to leverage and other features, are also explained.
Th e United States currently limits the interest deductions of a parent company to 50 percent of adjusted taxable income, namely earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, plus a few specifi c deductions when calculating taxable income. Th e fi gure of 50 percent is considerably higher than the recent experience of several large nonfi nancial corporations. 24 Under the Obama administration, the US Treasury has insistently tried to slash this cap to as low as 10 percent and thereby signifi cantly reduce interest expense deducted by US parent fi rms. 25 If the administration had its way, the eff ective tax rate on MNC global income would rise. Th e administration's proposal fails to acknowledge that the parent company likely has the strongest credit rating and therefore can borrow at the most favorable terms-a sensible course, quite apart from the tax dimension.
24. See box 4 in Action 4, based on data for 79 companies published by PricewaterhouseCoopers.
25. See, for example, page 10 of the US Treasury's General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2016 Revenue Proposals (available at www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf ).
Action 6. Prevent Treaty Abuse
Bilateral economic agreements-whether bilateral investment treaties (BITs), free trade agreements (FTAs), or double tax treaties (DTTs)-all grapple with a common problem: how to confi ne the benefi ts to the intended citizens, residents, and fi rms of the partner countries. To illustrate the magnitude of the insider versus outsider problem, some 2,926 BITs are in force, together with 406 FTAs and more than 3,000 DTTs (see UNCTAD 2015, chapter III).
In the case of BITs, this has been a modest problem. For the most part, if a third-country fi rm establishes itself in one of the partner countries, the partners have no objection when that fi rm claims treaty benefi ts-for example, national treatment. 26 Recently, however, complaints were voiced when Philip Morris Asia invoked the Australia-Hong Kong BIT to bring an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) case against Australia for its plain packaging tobacco law.
27
In the case of FTAs, the problem gets more attention because of rules of origin that determine which merchandise imports are eligible for the reduced or zero FTA tariff rate. In principle, the rules of origin are designed to forestall "trade defl ection," the practice of exporting third-country merchandise to the partner with the lowest most favored nation (MFN) tariff rate and then shipping the goods at the preferential FTA tariff rate to the other partner. In practice, however, forestalling trade defl ection is the secondary objective of rules of origin. Th e primary objective is to induce the partner country to purchase precursor inputs from the other partner rather than from a third country. For this reason, free traders generally regard rules of origin as "rules of discrimination." 28 A prime example was the insistence by the United States, in the NAFTA negotiations, that US textiles be used in Mexican production of garments that are in turn exported to the US market (the "yarn forward" rule of origin). A similar rule is likely to be incorporated in the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP). From the standpoint of global commerce, restrictive rules of origin constitute an undesirable trade barrier.
In the case of DTTs, the problem of limiting benefi ts has received so much attention that it has acquired two monikers: "treaty abuse" and "treaty shopping." Tax offi cials fret when third-country fi rms reap the benefi ts of a tax treaty between diff erent pairs of countries. But wait! For 70 years, US trade and investment policies have encouraged fi rms to do business anywhere and everywhere. Just like commercial codes, property laws, and public institutions, so a nation's tax treaty network can, perhaps in a small way, make that country a more desirable place to do business. Why should "outsider" US MNCs not be able to take equal advantage of that network to the same extent as "insider" MNCs based either in the country
26. An important example was the European Commission's decision, in 1989, to extend the right to conduct cross-border banking activity in the European Union to US and other third-country banks, not just European banks (Hufbauer 1990 ).
27. For an account of the dispute see www.ag.gov.au/tobaccoplainpackaging (accessed on September 6, 2015).
28. Th is was the view of John Simpson, the US Treasury offi cial who negotiated rules of origin in NAFTA.
itself or in one of its partners? And why should foreign MNCs not be able to take advantage of a US tax treaty by locating in the partner country?
Th e contrary argument seems to be that, by taking advantage of third-country tax treaty networks, the MNC will pay less tax than it otherwise might. Th is argument comes back to a central goal of the BEPS project: to defend and increase corporate taxation. Th is is not a sensible goal. If a country decides to make tax treaty concessions to fi rms based in a partner country (in exchange for reciprocal concessions to its own fi rms), there is no overriding reason for denying those same concessions-for example, lower withholding tax rates on royalty, interest, and dividend payments-to new fi rms established in the partner country, including subsidiary arms of foreign MNCs.
Th e Action 6 report agrees with this view-but only when the CFC conducts "substantial business activity" in the partner country. Th e report recommends detailed "anti-abuse" tax treaty language that seeks to defi ne bona fi de corporate residents of the partner country (based on benefi cial ownership tests) and to distinguish "substantial business activity" CFCs from those that are merely treaty shopping (another pejorative term favored by OECD tax experts). To identify treaty shoppers and deny them benefi ts, the Action 6 report spells out treaty language that would ensure meaningful limitation of benefi t (LOB) rules and a strict principal purposes test (PPT). Th e details are every bit as complex as FTA rules of origin. Nevertheless, the Action 6 report recommends that treaty countries enact such anti-abuse provisions in domestic law.
Th e US Treasury adamantly opposes the principal purposes test. Years ago, the Treasury negotiated a tax treaty with Italy that contained a PPT provision, but the treaty was rejected by the US Senate because the PPT would expose US fi rms to a denial of treaty benefi ts on highly subjective grounds. Th e treaty was renegotiated to exclude the PPT provision. Th e Treasury has repeatedly pointed out this bit of tax history to the OECD.
Stepping back from the details-which if nothing else guarantee full employment to thousands of tax lawyers-it's hard to see how the anti-abuse campaign serves US interests. Unlike other advanced countries, the United States has a sparse network of tax treaties-just 68, not many with developing countries. By comparison, the United Kingdom and Netherlands have 129, France has 120, Germany has 105, and Japan has 70. Recent research using fi rm-level data shows that the existence of DTT exerts a positive eff ect on FDI (Blonigen, Oldenski, and Sly 2014) . Here again US MNCs are disadvantaged relative to their foreign peers. Th e main reasons for the relatively sparse US network are this country's allergy to "tax-sparing credits"
29
; its insistence on low withholding rates for interest, dividend, and royalty payments; its narrow defi nition of a permanent establishment (see the discussion of Action 7); 29. A "tax-sparing credit" is a foreign tax credit given by an advanced home country (such as the United States or Germany) to a developing host country (such as Brazil or Indonesia) for taxes waived to encourage development in the host country.
and its reluctance to share taxpayer information with countries that do not observe strict confi dentiality standards. In fact, the only reason for the United States to champion the campaign would be to deter MNCs based in nontreaty countries from setting up shop in a US treaty partner and collecting royalties, interest, or dividends from US sources but taxed at low treaty withholding rates rather than the statutory 30 percent rate. But nontreaty MNCs that are attracted by low US treaty withholding rates have already set up CFCs with substantial business activities in US treaty partners and will continue to do so, meeting any LOB test that the United States includes in future treaties. Hence even this rationale does not make a strong argument for climbing aboard the anti-abuse campaign.
Action 7. Prevent the Artifi cial Avoidance of PE Status
Action 7 delves into the details of permanent establishment status, the traditional threshold for taxing a foreign fi rm on its business profi ts (as distinct from VAT, retail sales, or excise taxes, which are imposed on importation of merchandise). Th e thrust of Action 7 is to enlarge the range of export sales that would engender PE status and thereby expose an MNC to taxation on business profi ts arising from those sales.
Th is comes perilously close to reimposing tariff s that have previously been bound in the WTO or FTAs. While not couched as a tariff , the BEPS approach would determine the value of export activities related to the sale of goods and then tax that value. Th at is only marginally diff erent from the sorts of things the WTO agreement on customs valuation seeks to constrain when applied by customs offi cials rather than tax offi cials-in other words, a distinction without a diff erence.
Turning to the details, one proposal is to label commissionnaires as permanent establishments. Under a commissionnaire arrangement the foreign fi rm retains title to the merchandise but entrusts its sale, delivery, and service to a local fi rm that is either controlled by or habitually contracts with the foreign 26 fi rm. If the BEPS proposal is adopted, US exporters that rely on commissionnaires will suddenly fi nd themselves exposed to corporate taxation in many countries.
A second proposal curtails the exceptions for specifi c activities that might otherwise confer PE status.
Th ese exceptions are customarily scheduled in existing tax treaties. Th e focus of the BEPS suggestion is on activities that appear, in the eyes of some participants, to go beyond "preparatory or auxiliary" activities;
cited are delivery activities, the purchase of goods, the collection of information, and the fragmentation of activities between related parties. Again, if adopted, this suggestion will suddenly expose many US exporters to corporate taxation in a large number of countries.
A third proposal, discussed under Action 1, is to tax the business profi ts of digital sellers, despite the absence of any physical presence in the purchasing country. If adopted, this proposal will seriously impact US software, entertainment, musical, and news fi rms, all of them world leaders in their respective digital spaces.
Taken as a whole, BEPS Action 7 has only downside consequences for US fi rms and the US economy.
Actions 8, 9, 10. Discussion Draft on Revisions to Chapter I of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines
Transfer pricing lies at the heart of the BEPS project. Econometric studies pioneered by Hines and Rice in 1994 , and elaborated by scholars more than a hundred times since, convincingly show that MNCs book an exceptional share of their global profi ts in low-tax jurisdictions and that these "excess" profi ts largely arise from the sales activities of intermediate affi liates and from intangible assets-copyrights, trademarks, and patents. If the OECD spoke like Marcellus in Hamlet it might declare "Something is rotten in the state of Denmark." But the OECD is staff ed by bureaucrats, not playwrights, and instead has issued numerous reports and guidelines in the forlorn quest to "get transfer prices right."
At the request of tax offi cials, the OECD fi rst got into the business of analyzing transfer pricing more than three decades ago with an internal unpublished report titled Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises (1979) . Th at report was approved by the Committee on Fiscal Aff airs in 1995 and fi rst published that same year. Numerous extensions followed, which were codifi ed into guidelines. Th e latest
manual, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrators, was
published in 2010 and runs to 372 pages.
BEPS Actions 8, 9, and 10, running to 46 pages, propose to revise Chapter I of the 2010 Guidelines.
Chapter I explicates the fundamental "arm's-length principle" for transfer prices. Applying this principle, MNCs and tax offi cials seek to determine the price that independent buyers and sellers, negotiating at arm's length, would agree for the same asset, product, or service at the same time, in the same volume, and with the same origin and destination as the transaction at issue. Th is is easier said than done, which helps explain why the 2010 Guidelines and the proposed Action revisions would together exceed 400 pages of dense text.
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Th e gold standard for implementing the arm's-length principle is the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP), the price actually charged between two independent fi rms for a transaction very similar to the one under investigation. In real life the CUP can seldom be found for two reasons: (1) the assets, products, and services transferred between MNC affi liates have unique characteristics, implying that the CUP or even approximations do not exist; (2) even when approximations do exist, independent fi rms often refuse to share their pricing data with tax authorities or MNCs. In response to these facts of commercial life, the 2010 Guidelines lay out multiple alternatives to the CUP standard.
Formula Approaches
At this juncture, many commentators throw up their hands and seek to jettison the arm's-length principle.
Th ey propose instead to calculate the profi ts of each individual fi rm in an MNC group by using a handy formula-for example, the individual fi rm's share of group employees, assets, or sales, or some combination of all three.
As seductive as the formula approach sounds, it suff ers a fatal defect. It would be impossible to persuade OECD countries, much less emerging countries outside the OECD (e.g., Brazil, China, India), to agree on common formulas. 30 Consequently the same income would often be counted in the tax base of two or more countries. For more than 50 years nations have agreed on the arm's-length principle, and a dispute resolution system between tax authorities is built on it. If the principle is abandoned, decades of tax chaos seem all but certain.
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Potential Special Measures
Leaving aside the digression on formula approaches, what diff erence do Actions 8, 9, and 10 make to the 2010 Guidelines? Th e main diff erence is revealed in the lead paragraph to Part II of the report, titled
Potential Special Measures:
As the BEPS Action Plan indicates, the main aim of the Transfer Pricing Actions (8-10) is to assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation. Th e BEPS Action Plan also indicates that in order to achieve this aim "special measures, either within or beyond the arm's length principle, may be required with regard to intangible assets, risk and over-capitalisation.
30. US states have practiced formula apportionment of corporate profi ts for more than a century, but are still struggling to agree on a common formula (some combination of payroll, sales, and property) and the common measurement of factors (labor, sales, and assets). For a sympathetic paper on formula apportionment, see Weiner (1999) . For citations to more critical views, see pages 8-10 of OECD (2010c). For easy reading, see the Wikipedia article on formulary apportionment (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formulary_apportionment; accessed on September 6, 2015).
31. It's worth recalling the confl ict between the United States and Europe triggered by California's application of formulary apportionment in the early 1980s. President Reagan had to establish a cabinet-level working group, including governors and companies, to address the problem. If followed, the BEPS recommendation to broaden the defi nition of a permanent establishment could slide into formulary apportionment of profi ts earned on export sales and reprise this unhappy history.
Th e special measures of greatest concern are those that depart from the arm's length principle. An alarming proposal is Option 1 on "hard-to-value intangibles": Action 8 of the BEPS Project requires the development of transfer pricing rules or special measures for transfers of hard-to-value intangibles. Th e need for a measure arises because of the potential for systematic mispricing in circumstances where no reliable comparables exist, where assumptions used in valuation are speculative, and where information asymmetries between taxpayers and tax administrations are acute. Th e most signifi cant issues can arise where it is diffi cult to verify the assumptions on which a fi xed price is agreed sometimes several years before the intangible generates income.
Th e measure could target circumstances where the taxpayer:
 fi xes the price either as a lump sum or as a fi xed royalty rate on the basis of projections without any further contingent payment mechanism; and  does not contemporaneously document those projections and make them available to the tax administration.
Th e eff ect of the measure would permit the tax administration to presume that a price adjustment mechanism would have been adopted and as a result may rebase the calculations based on the actual outcome, imputing a contingent payment mechanism. A contingent payment mechanism may include any price adjustment made by reference to contingent events, including the achievement of fi nancial thresholds such as sale or profi ts.
Likewise departing from the arm's-length principle, Option 2 puts an "independent investor" in the shoes of the MNC, Option 3 examines instances of "thick capitalization," Option 4 spells out the attributes of a "minimal functional entity," and Option 5 is aimed at "ensuring appropriate taxation of excess returns."
It's hard to predict how much grief these options, together with other BEPS recommendations, would give US MNCs if implemented. However, one can draw on Grubert's (2012) For purposes of making a rough guess of the dollar amounts involved, this calculation assumes that the same income and sales shares prevailed in 2010, a year when aggregate pretax worldwide income of US MNCs was about $2.03 trillion (Barefoot 2012). If, under BEPS guidelines, an additional 19.9 32. Grubert attributes a large part of the diff erential between income and sales shares to the diff erential between the foreign eff ective tax rate (15.9 percent in 2004) and the US statutory rate (35 percent). For a more complete analysis, see Hufbauer and Vieiro (2013 In the end, actual US Treasury revenue gains would be far smaller and US economic losses would be substantial.
Th is working paper does not undertake the ambitious task of modeling alternative scenarios and juxtaposing revenue gains against economic losses. However, such an inquiry is essential long before the BEPS Actions fi nd their way into US statutory tax law or tax treaties.
Action 8. Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles
Action 8 supplements Actions 8, 9, and 10, and recommends revision of Chapters I, II, and VI of the 2010 Guidelines. It provides 5 examples of "MNE group synergies" and 33 examples of "special considerations" in an eff ort to distinguish the proper pricing of intangibles from confounding factors. Some examples are new, others were in the 2010 Guidelines. It's not obvious that the new examples will change transfer pricing outcomes, but they will surely bring billable hours to the transfer pricing profession.
Th e inescapable problem is that, unlike physical assets such as an offi ce building, an oil well, or a factory, there is no obvious and unique location for intangible assets such as copyrights, trademarks, 33. Th e average eff ective federal tax rate on MNC income is about 28 percent (see Dyreng et al. 2014 ). However, for this "what if " calculation, the federal statutory rate is most appropriate because income remitted from abroad pays the statutory rate minus any foreign tax credit. If the hypothetical additional US income were merely the consequence of new source rules (erstwhile foreign source income now defi ned as US source income) it would not bring additional foreign tax credits, so the federal statutory rate would apply.
34. Th is fi gure is calculated as the average foreign eff ective tax rate of 15.9 percent reported by Grubert times the hypothetical amount of income reported as US source rather than foreign source. 36. See the summary of Secretary Lew's fi xes in Hufbauer (2014) . See United States Senate Committee on Finance (2015d, pp. 7-8) . Also see Financial Times, "Cranes Deal Lifts Tally of Tax Inversions," August 12, 2015, p. 14, and "Senator Blasts CF Industries' UK Tax Plans," August 13, 2015, p. 12. patents, and trade secrets. Th e initial creation may well occur at a known site, but thereafter ownership of all or part of the asset may be transferred to another jurisdiction (e.g., the right to use a trademark in a specifi c geographic location). Moreover, recognition and protection of intangible assets depends on local laws, so place of creation, place of ownership, and place of use can all be factors in determining the location of income.
Harmless Suggestions
Action 2. Neutralize the Eff ects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements
Hybrid mismatch arrangements, entailing payments and receipts between MNC affi liates, are designed for one of two purposes: fi rst to deduct the same expense twice, once at home and once abroad (abbreviated DD, for double deduction); or second to deduct the expense in one jurisdiction but not include it as income earned in another (abbreviated D/NI, for deduction, not included). Th ese outcomes occur because the two (or more) affi liates are subject to diff erent rules for reporting income and expense by their respective jurisdictions.
While mismatch arrangements are complex, the Action 2 report does a good job of illustrating income and expense fl ows that yield the desired tax benefi ts. Certainly, the arrangements off end aesthetic sensibilities. Under the principle that every deductible expense should lead to a corresponding income receipt, and no expense should be deducted twice, the arrangements also off end tax precepts. In fact, mismatch arrangements seldom have a business rationale other than reducing tax payments.
But hold on! Mismatch arrangements have been a staple of US tax law for more than a generation.
Medical and pension plan expenses are deductible by business fi rms, but the benefi ts to employees are either not taxed currently or not taxed at all. Th e same goes for interest paid by a corporation to a nonprofi t institution. Double deductions often occur in the context of long-term real property leases.
Before the US Treasury takes a hatchet to DD and D/NI arrangements in the international context, it should at least ask what the impact will be on the eff ective tax rate paid by US MNCs on their foreign income, and how much new revenue will fl ow to the US Treasury. According to a previous OECD report, citing a letter from the IRS commissioner to the US Senate, 11 US "foreign tax credit generator" transactions involved about $3.5 billion of tax at stake, but it is unclear whether most of this amount would actually have been paid to the IRS if the transactions were disallowed or would simply discourage repatriation of foreign income (see OECD 2012a, p. 5).
Action 12. Mandatory Disclosure Rules
Action 12 seeks advance disclosure to tax authorities of schemes that smell of tax avoidance. It proposes that taxpayers and/or "promoters" (defi ned as advisors who put together the tax plans) be required to fi le disclosure forms before implementing such schemes and that failure to make full and timely disclosure be 31 penalized heavily. Th e triple objectives are to give tax administrators a heads-up, to deter the use of such schemes, and to enable legislators to change the law before new schemes go into eff ect.
Fleshing out details, Action 12 lists hallmarks of tax avoidance (e.g., schemes that generate tax losses in high-tax jurisdictions or that entail hybrid arrangements) and suggests the scope and timing of reports.
Th e scope of reports does not exceed (and generally falls well short of ) what might be required in an audit, but the timing is prior to implementation-which of course is several years before an audit.
Several OECD countries-for example, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Korea-already have disclosure rules. US disclosure rules, which were introduced in 1984 and have been expanded several times since, appear to be the most comprehensive. In fact, Action 12 seems designed to urge other countries to follow the US disclosure template. Th e United States would need few, if any, changes in its rules to satisfy the Action 12 proposals.
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Useful Suggestions
Action 1. Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy: VAT and Retail Sales Tax
As mentioned, Action 1 has two parts, a troublesome section (discussed earlier) on the taxation of business profi ts, and a useful section on VAT and retail sales taxes on digital commerce. Public fi nance experts generally agree that consumption taxes are far less distortive and do less damage to growth prospects than taxes on business profi ts (OECD 2010a (OECD , 2012b ). An argument against VAT, voiced in the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal and frequently invoked in Congress, is that additional revenues would expand public spending, not reduce other taxes. 38 Other commentators object to the regressive character of VAT taxation, though in principle that can be compensated by adjustments in the personal income tax. 39 In any event, these arguments have defeated any move toward VAT in the US federal revenue system (Hufbauer and Grieco 2005) , and that fact has relevance to international tax rules. Since anti-VAT forces have successfully precluded US adoption, international rules that enable VAT to be collected on digital sales will put money into the coff ers of foreign fi nance ministries but not into the US Treasury. On the other hand, rules that facilitate state collection of retail sales tax would feed the coff ers of US states. 40 37. It's an open question whether the compliance costs of strict US disclosure rules exceed their benefi t in terms of curtailing tax evasion. As with many aspects of tax administration, no cost-benefi t analysis has been published.
38. See box 4.1 in Hufbauer and Grieco (2005) .
39. For a detailed exposition, see Graetz (2008) .
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. Th e US Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1997 blocked state or federal taxation of internet access. However, it enabled states to apply their retail sales taxes to physical goods purchased over the internet. A subsequent amendment narrowed the defi nition of "internet access" to "not include voice, audio or video programming, or other products and services…for which there is a charge." In principle, therefore, states can apply their retail sales taxes not only to physical goods but also to commercial internet services. However, the Supreme Court held, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 US 298 (1992) , that an out-of-state vendor of goods purchased through mail order cannot be subject to state sales tax unless the vendor has a substantial "nexus" with the state levying the tax (an account of the case is available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quill_Corp._v._North_Dakota; accessed
As shown in 
Action 5. Counter Harmful Tax Practices More Eff ectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance
Th e heart of Action 5 is a set of proposals for the "spontaneous" compulsory exchange of information between tax authorities about rulings that aff ect the tax position of MNCs and their CFCs. Th e proposals apply only to partners in a double tax treaty, of which over 3,000 are now in existence (the United States has 68). To the chagrin of some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the report does not call for public disclosure, only the exchange of information between tax authorities. Moreover, only rulings that meet the tests of several fi lters are subject to the compulsory exchange: the information must relate to a preferential tax regime; the regime must entail a low eff ective tax rate; the ruling must be taxpayerspecifi c; and the ruling must involve inbound investment or transfer prices. 41. It is worth noting that, under the WTO, VAT cannot be imposed on imports at a higher rate than on domestic sales. By contrast, the BEPS Action 7 recommendation for broadening the defi nition of permanent establishment would lead to a discriminatory tax on imports.
42. Performance rights organizations (e.g., BMI, ASCAP, and SESAC) collect royalties from radio stations, restaurants, bars, etc. for music played and distribute the money to songwriters and publishers. Similar mechanisms could be used for VAT and sales tax payments.
At the federal level, the United States has few preferential tax regimes aimed at attracting foreign Since the United States has practically no double tax treaties with countries that might be regarded as tax havens, the main advantage to the United States from the exchange of information would relate to rulings issued by countries such as China, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom on their own preferential tax regimes, such as patent boxes and development zones. Th is information might be marginally useful to the Internal Revenue Service. 
Action 14. Make Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Eff ective
Action 14, unlike the preceding actions, could actually benefi t MNCs. MNCs often fi nd themselves taxed on the same income by two countries. Th is can happen when, for example, the tax offi cials of country A say the proper transfer price on a sale to country B was $50 per ton, and country B's tax offi cials claim that it was $40 per ton. In such cases, the "competent authority" article in a DTT requires the respective tax offi cials to meet and try to agree on the transfer price.
However, the competent authority article puts no time limit on deliberations, nor does it require the two sets of tax offi cials to reach an agreement. Action 14 attempts to speed up deliberations and create a stronger obligation to resolve the dispute-both steps in the right direction. would be agreed by OECD members. Th e current draft of Action 15 blocks out space for the suggested topics but does not off er draft text for the articles. However, as long as the draft contains a principal purposes test, it will for that reason alone be unacceptable to the United States. Th e current target for completing Action 15 is the end of 2016.
CONCLUSIONS
Many countries seek to attract MNCs by lowering their corporate tax rates and otherwise creating an attractive tax climate. Just as some US states, such as Texas, Washington, and Ohio, have eliminated their corporate income taxes, so Ireland, Singapore, and Switzerland off er very low rates. Even large countries, such as Canada, China, and the United Kingdom, have joined the lower-tax brigade. Not only do such countries tax corporate income earned at home at modest rates, but they also tax corporate income earned abroad very lightly, if at all. Several have created patent boxes to tax intellectual property income earned at home at sharply reduced rates, and most off er more generous R&D tax incentives than the United States.
Yet since 1986 the United States has kept its federal corporate rate at 35 percent, now among the highest statutory rates as most countries have lowered theirs, in some cases by as much as half, and the United States continues to tax MNC income earned abroad when that income is repatriated to US shores. 45 During the past 30 years, all other advanced countries progressively reduced their statutory corporate tax rates, and most of them adopted variants of the territorial tax system, meaning they taxed active income earned abroad by their MNCs at low or zero rates.
Th e outcome is not surprising. Some US companies choose to invert-they merge with a foreign fi rm, which then becomes the parent corporation. Other US companies are simply acquired by foreign fi rms. Either way, the US Treasury no longer has a tax claim on the income of subsidiary corporations based abroad. 46 Meanwhile, nearly all US-based MNCs try to locate income derived from intellectual property rights (trademarks, copyrights, patents, and trade secrets) in low-tax jurisdictions. When tax ISDS arbitration proceedings, unlike competent authority proceedings, MNCs have a seat at the table and a reasonable expectation of timely adjudication.
45. Th e average eff ective tax rate paid by US MNCs is around 28 percent. As a rule, eff ective tax rates are several percentage points lower than statutory tax rates and US eff ective rates are signifi cantly higher than other OECD countries. Moreover, the way the US tax system works, when US MNCs repatriate income from abroad, the combined foreign and US tax equals the US federal statutory rate, 35 percent. States seldom collect tax on MNC incomer from abroad.
46. After an inversion, the Treasury can still tax income earned in the United States.
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rates make a diff erence between producing in the United States and producing abroad, some fi rms choose to produce abroad.
For the past three decades, the US Congress has been well aware of these developments and the practices whereby US MNCs book income in low-tax jurisdictions. Th e fact that successive US Congresses have refused to alter US tax rules with respect to mobile (passive) income earned abroad by US MNCs can be interpreted as an affi rmative decision to ensure that US MNCs could compete, in their operations abroad, with European and Asian MNCs and not be handicapped by a sharply higher global eff ective tax rate. Similarly, US congressional forbearance on the use by US MNCs of low-tax jurisdictions to book intellectual property income can be seen as an alternative to explicit patent box legislation.
Given this tax and legislative history, the US Congress should lay aside the BEPS report (but commission the studies suggested earlier) and concentrate on enacting meaningful reforms that align US corporate taxation with practices of competing nations worldwide to ensure that the United States remains an attractive location for MNC headquarters and production.
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APPENDIX A TAXES PAID BY APPLE AND ITS STAKEHOLDERS
Th e focus of the BEPS project is to squeeze more tax revenue from MNCs, whether paid to host countries or home countries. With that focus in mind, it's instructive to review the tax picture of Apple and its affi liates worldwide, taxes paid both by Apple and by its stakeholders.
Apple ranks among the most successful and innovative companies of our time. It has also been heavily criticized for not paying corporate income taxes on its worldwide income at the US federal statutory rate of 35 percent. 47 A sketch of the company's overall tax picture sheds a better perspective on this criticism. Table A .1 provides the data that inform the sketch.
In 2014, Apple reported worldwide revenue of $183 billion, of which $69 billion was earned on sales in the United States and $114 billion on sales abroad. Th e fi rm's global profi t before taxes was $53.5 billion, of which $19.9 billion was reported as profi t earned in the United States and $33.6 billion was reported as profi t earned abroad-including in low-tax jurisdictions. Apple paid US corporate income tax (federal and state) of $12.5 billion, more than 60 percent of its US profi ts. It also paid $1.5 billion collectively to foreign jurisdictions, for an indicated average eff ective tax rate on its global profi ts of 26.1 percent.
Apple's nonretail US employees are concentrated in high-tech activities, including R&D, design, marketing, and fi nance. Capital gains are another source of tax revenue. Taking the S&P 500 as a group, corporate share prices rather closely track a semiconstant multiple of book value. On average, for all S&P 500
corporations, an increase of $100 in book value translates into an increase of at least $250 in stock market 47. Apple books a substantial part of its sales and intellectual property income in low-tax jurisdictions. Unless this income is repatriated to the United States, the only taxes paid are those levied by the jurisdiction in question. 
